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Abstract—In this paper, we model a Stackelberg game in a
simple Gaussian test channel where a human transmitter (leader)
communicates a source message to a human receiver (follower).
We model human decision making using prospect theory models
proposed for continuous decision spaces. Assuming that the value
function is the squared distortion at both the transmitter and
the receiver, we analyze the effects of the weight functions at
both the transmitter and the receiver on optimal communication
strategies, namely encoding at the transmitter and decoding at
the receiver, in the Stackelberg sense. We show that the optimal
strategies for the behavioral agents in the Stackelberg sense are
identical to those designed for unbiased agents. At the same time,
we also show that the prospect-theoretic distortions at both the
transmitter and the receiver are both larger than the expected
distortion, thus making behavioral agents less contended than
unbiased agents. Consequently, the presence of cognitive biases
increases the need for transmission power in order to achieve a
given distortion at both transmitter and receiver.
Index Terms—Strategic Communication, Prospect Theory
I. INTRODUCTION
Communication systems have been actively studied by sev-
eral research scholars under various application scenarios over
the past 7 decades [1]. In the field of information theory [2]
and communication technology [3], researchers have focused
on the design and analysis of communication systems under
synergistic conditions between the senders and the receivers.
Such a cooperative behavior may not always exist in practice,
especially in scenarios where information exchange takes place
in a competitive scenario. For example, in a typical bargaining
setup, the seller does not have the same intention as the buyer
to share information regarding a given product-of-interest.
In such a case, the seller may even find an incentive to
falsify product information before sharing it with the buyer.
Communication in the absence of synergy between the sender
and the receiver has been extensively studied in the economics
literature under the labels of signaling games [4], strategic
communication [5] and cheap talk [6].
Strategic communication was first studied by Crawford and
Sobel in [5], where they have considered a non-synergistic
setting due to non-identical utilities at the sender and the
receiver. More specifically, such a disparity arises in the
presence of some private information at the sender, which
in turn influences the sender’s utility. On the other hand, the
receiver has a different utility, which is independent of sender’s
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private information. Crawford and Sobel have found that both
the sender and the receiver employ quantization strategies at
Nash equilibrium. In contrast, Kamenica and Gentzkow have
studied the problem of Bayesian persuasion in [7], where
they have derived necessary and sufficient conditions for the
existence of a transmitted signal that benefits the sender.
Recently, Akyol et al. have adapted traditional settings such
as compression, coded and uncoded communication studied
by the information theory community, into a strategic setting
in [8]. Furthermore, Saritas¸ et al. have extended Crawford-
Sobel’s framework to multidimensional sources in the presence
of a Gaussian test channel in [9], where the authors have
investigated conditions for existence/uniqueness of both Nash
and Stackelberg equilibria. Unlike Crawford and Sobel, [7],
[10] and [9] have studied Stackelberg games in strategic
communication, where the receiver (follower) optimizes its
decoding strategy based on the encoding policy employed by
the sender (leader). Particularly, in the context of a simple
communication setting over Gaussian test channels, they have
showed that the optimal strategies in the strategic sense are
zero-delay linear mappings (uncoded transmissions), which are
also optimal in the Shannon sense.
In the context of decentralized control systems, a different
kind of misalignment has been investigated in the context
of team decision problems. Bas¸ar had studied a multiplayer
problem in the presence of mismatched beliefs (prior dis-
tributions) regarding an unknown source and individual (un-
shared) measurements in [11], and had shown that the op-
timal strategies in the sense of Nash equilibrium are linear
mappings, while they are generally nonlinear mappings in the
sense of Stackelberg equilibria in the presence of Gaussian
priors. Recently, Akyol et al. studied a Bayesian manipulation
framework in [10], where the motives of the sender and
the receiver are misaligned due to two reasons: mismatched
beliefs and the presence of private information at the sender.
Although the optimal strategies in the Stackelberg sense are
still linear mappings, the sender can take additional leverage
from the mismatched priors and send false information to the
receiver. Such a strategy improves the sender’s utility, while
deteriorating the utility at the receiver.
In this paper, we consider a different kind of misalignment
between the sender and the receiver, which arises due to the
differences in their behavioral psychology. We consider a sim-
ple Gaussian test channel where both the transmitter and the
receiver are human agents, whose utilities are modeled using
prospect theory. The main difference between the mismatch
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2models studied in the past and our current model is that
the cognitive biases of the behavioral agents also distort the
channel’s transition probability distributions, along with the
source distributions. In this paper, we focus on the nonlinear
reaction to probabilities by human agents, which is well-
captured by weighting functions in prospect theory models
[12]–[15]. We show that the transmitter can no longer take
leverage from the behavioral mismatch, since the optimal
strategies at the transmitter and the receiver are identical to
that of an unbiased agent. At the same time, we also show
that this behavioral mismatch has a positive impact on the
agent’s distortion functions, making them more satisfied than
the case of an unbiased agent.
Recently, several researchers have considered the problem
of designing decision-theoretic systems and/or control systems
with humans-in-the-loop. Some of these works model human
agents using prospect theory in order to design systems in the
presence of agents that portray behaviors such as endowment
effect, loss aversion and anchoring, which cannot be explained
by the traditional expected utility theory. In the context of
decision-theoretic systems, Nadendla et al. have presented
detection rules employed by prospect theoretic agents in [16]
under different scenarios based on decision costs. In particular,
the authors have focused on two types of prospect theoretic
agents, namely optimists and pessimists, and have shown that
the prospect-theoretic decision rules may deviate significantly
from decision rules that are optimal in the Bayesian sense. This
separation between the decision rules employed by humans
and unbiased agents depends on the degree of cognitive bias
present in the agent’s utility. In the context of communication
systems, Li and Mandayam have analyzed the behavior/impact
of prospect theoretic agents in wireless networks in [17], where
selfish players deviate from maximizing expected utilities and
employ equilibrium policies for transmission over a random
access channel under throughput rewards, delay penalties and
energy costs. In [18], Yu et al. have investigated the problem
of spectrum investment (whether to sense and use the spectrum
without any conflict as a secondary user, or lease the spectrum
from the primary user) at a prospect-theoretic user when the
spectrum is available with uncertainty. In the case of power
systems, El Rahi et al. have modeled the interaction between
microgrid operators within a smart grid as a Bayesian game
in [19], where the prospect-theoretic microgrid operator can
choose to either sell its stored energy immediately, or can store
for future emergencies. Sanjab et al. have formulated in [20]
a cyber-physical security problem involving drone delivery
systems and adversarial interdiction attacks, and have studied
the underlying game using prospect theory which captures the
subjective behaviors of the players.
II. PRELIMINARIES ON HUMAN DECISION MAKING
The study of human decision making has gained significant
interest after Von Neumann and Morgenstern first proposed
a rationality model for individual human agents in [21]
based on maximizing the agents’ respective expected utilities,
and modeled interaction between multiple human agents in
a game-theoretic setting. This rationality model for human
decision makers based on expected utility theory has been
widely accepted in solving decision problems across several
disciplines. However, there have been several accounts in the
behavioral economics and psychology literatures where hu-
mans significantly deviate from the aforementioned rationality
model based on maximizing expected utilities. For example,
behaviors such as loss aversion, framing and anchoring are not
accounted for in the expected utility framework.
Some of the initial attempts to expand the horizons of
expected utility theory were based on the broad class of
bounded rationality models [22] proposed by Herbert Simon
in the 1950s. These models assume that the agent’s rationality
can be limited broadly due to one or more reasons such
as non-classical information structures, limited memory and
computational complexity, to name a few. Meanwhile, there
were also attempts to study human decision making using
random utilities within a utility-maximization framework in
order to incorporate the uncertainties regarding the knowledge
of agents’ utilities. Some standard examples of random-utility
models include logit, nested logit, probit and generalized
extreme value (GEV) models [23].
Although several choice models have been proposed to im-
prove expected utility theory over the following three decades,
these models were not successful in comprehensively model-
ing human behavior, until Kahmenan and Tversky proposed
an alternative descriptive model called prospect theory for
discrete choice sets in [13]. In the following subsection, we
present a brief description of Kahneman-Tversky’s prospect
theory model as a prelude to our analysis of the main problem
in the balance of the paper.
A. Prospect Theory
According to Kahneman and Tversky in [13], human de-
cision making is a distorted utility-maximization framework
where the distortion in probabilities due to human cognition
is modeled using a weight function and the distortion in
rewards/costs due to human cognition is modeled using value
functions. This can be summarized as follows.
Let an agent be presented with a set C = {1, · · · ,M} of
M discrete choices. Let pi be the probability with which the
agent decides to choose i ∈ C, and xi be the corresponding
outcome for choosing i ∈ C. Then the agent experiences a
utility
V =
M∑
i=1
w(pi)v(xi), (1)
where w : [0, 1] → [0, 1] is the weight function that maps
the true probabilities to the agent’s subjective probabilities,
and v : R → R is the value function that maps the outcome
of a given decision to its perceived value. Weight functions
typically capture the human agent’s introspection of the choice
probabilities in a sequestered manner. Such an isolated analysis
has been practically observed to result in overestimating prob-
abilities of the rarer choices and underestimating probabilities
of the more likely choices, thus resulting in a weight function
with a convex-concave shape, as shown in Figure 1a. On
the other hand, value functions capture the human agent’s
3p
w(p)
Unbiased cognitive behavior
0 1
1
Typical cognitive behavior
(a) Typical weight-function
x
v(x)
Unbiased cognitive behavior
Typical cognitive behavior
Reference point
(b) Typical value-function
Fig. 1: Typical Weight and Value Functions in Prospect Theory Models
valuation of a given outcome based on its psychological
introspection of gains and losses about a set reference point.
This is typically observed to be an S-shaped function as shown
in Figure 1b, with a steeper slope on the losses to capture the
behavior of loss-aversion. For details regarding the estimation
of weight and value functions, the reader may refer to the
relevant nonlinear regression methods in [24], [25].
B. Prospect Theory for Continuous Decision Spaces
The downside of prospect theory model as proposed by
Kahmenan and Tversky in [13], is that it entails discrete
strategy spaces. Furthermore, very few efforts have been
successful in extending these models to continuous spaces
until about 10 years ago, when Rieger and Wang investigated
the convergence of discretized models in continuous spaces in
[15] within the context of prospect theory. In this subsection,
we provide an overview of the main results in [15], which we
will use in this paper to model human decision making.
While Rieger and Wang analyzed the convergence of dis-
cretized models in continuous spaces, they had found that
Schneider-Lopes’ model (similar to the one proposed by
Kahneman and Tversky in [13]) does not converge. For details,
the reader may refer to Theorem 2 in [15]. Interestingly,
the normalized prospect-theoretic utility, as proposed by Kar-
markar in [12], converges to a tractable form. Therefore, in
this paper, we use the model proposed by Rieger and Wang
in [15], which can be formally stated as follows:
Theorem 1 (Adapted from Theorems 1 and 3 in [15]). Let p
be a probability distribution on R with exponential decay at
infinity, and let pn be defined for all n ∈ N as
pn =
∑
z∈Z
pz,nδz/n, (2)
where
pz,n ,
∫ z+1
n
z
n
dp (3)
and Z is the set of integers. Then, if the value function v ∈
C1(R) has at most polynomial growth, and if there exists some
α ∈ (0, 1) and some finite number k > 0 such that
lim
→0
w()
α
= k, (4)
then, the prospect theory utility (proposed by Karmarkar in
[12])
PT (pn) =
∑
z
w(pz,n)v(z/n)∑
z
w(pz,n)
(5)
exists for all n ∈ N and converges to∫
p(x)αv(x)dx∫
p(x)αdx
(6)
as n→∞.
Since pn converges to p in the weak * topology, one can
extend PT to p by continuity and set
PT (p) ,
∫
p(x)αv(x)dx∫
p(x)αdx
. (7)
In this model, note that the parameter α captures the degree
at which an agent overvalues low probability events. This
is pointed out in Equation (4), where the parameter α is
defined as a polynomial exponent that approximates the weight
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Fig. 2: Strategic Communication over a Gaussian Test Channel
function effectively for very low (atomic) probability events.
Other characteristics of the weight function are irrelevant in
this model.
Given that the model presented in Theorem 1 is derived out
of a well-motivated discrete choice model and has a desired
form, it motivates us to consider the Rieger-Wang model
presented in Theorem 1 in characterizing human behavior in
decision theoretic frameworks.
III. PROBLEM SETUP
Consider a transmitter-receiver pair, namely Alice and Bob
respectively, as shown in Figure 2. Alice encodes the source
signal S ∼ N (0, σ2S) and transmits the encoded signal
U = g(S) to Bob over a Gaussian test channel such that
her behavioral distortion
DT (g, h) =
∫∫
[p(S = s,R = r)]
αT vT [S = s, Sˆ = h(r)] ds dr∫∫
[p(S = s,R = r)]
αT ds dr
(8)
is minimized. Furthermore, Alice is power-constrained, i.e.,
E(U2) ≤ P . Having received a signal R = U + N , where
N ∼ N (0, σ2N ), Bob decodes the received signal into Sˆ =
h(R) so as to minimize his behavioral distortion
DR(g, h) =
∫∫
[p(S = s,R = r)]
αR vR[S = s, Sˆ = h(r)] ds dr∫∫
[p(S = s,R = r)]
αR ds dr
,
(9)
where the weighting exponents at the transmitter and the
receiver are denoted by αT and αR, respectively. For the sake
of notational convenience, we sometimes ignore the type-index
k of the weighting parameter in αk where k ∈ {T,R}, and
denote it as α whenever our arguments hold true at both the
transmitter and the receiver.
The situation above naturally defines a leader-follower game
between Alice and Bob, with Alice acting as the leader. We
are interested in computing a Stackelberg equilibrium for this
game, i.e. a pair (g∗, h∗) such that
h∗(g) , argmin
h∈H
DR(g, h),
g∗ , argmin
g∈G
DT (g, h
∗(g)),
(10)
where G = {g ∈ H ∣∣ E [g(S)2] ≤ P } is the set of all
Borel measurable strategies that satisfy the transmitter’s power
constraint, and H is the set of all Borel measurable strategies.
As a first approach, we restrict ourselves to the space of
linear policies at the transmitter, which are denoted using the
parametric model
g(S) = k1S + k0, (11)
where k0 ∈ R and k1 ∈ R are Alice’s strategic parameters.
Furthermore, we also assume that both Alice and Bob employ
squared-error as their value functions, which are given by
vT (S, Sˆ) = vR(S, Sˆ) = (Sˆ − S)2, (12)
for all S ∈ R and Sˆ ∈ R.
IV. EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS
In this section, we analyze the Stackelberg equilibrium
between Alice (leader) and Bob (follower) within the space
of linear policies at the transmitter, as indicated in Equation
(11). Since Alice knows that Bob attempts to minimize DR,
she chooses an encoding strategy (i.e. find k0 and k1) that
minimizes DT , when Bob employs its best-response decoding
rule h(R) that minimizes DR.
Given that Alice employs a linear policy as shown in
Equation (11), we have U ∼ N (k0, k21σ2S). Bob collects a
noisy measurement R of the encoded signal U over an AWGN
channel, and therefore, we have R ∼ N (k0, k21σ2S + σ2N ) and
R|S ∼ N (k1S + k0, σ2N ).
Therefore, we can compute the conditional probability
p(S = s|R = r) = p(R = r|S = s)p(S = s)
p(R = r)
= N
(
k1σ
2
S(r − k0)
k21σ
2
S + σ
2
N
,
σ2Sσ
2
N
k21σ
2
S + σ
2
N
)
(13)
Given the conditional distribution p(S = s|R = r), we
compute the denominator of the distortion functions at both
Alice and Bob in Equations (8) and (9) respectively, as shown
below.
∫∫
[p(S = s,R = r)]
α
ds dr
=
∫
[p(R = r)]
α
(∫
[p(S = s|R = r)]α ds
)
dr
=
 1√
α
{
σSσN
√
2pi√
k21σ
2
S + σ
2
N
}1−α∫ [p(R = r)]α dr
=
 1√
α
{
σSσN
√
2pi√
k21σ
2
S + σ
2
N
}1−α ·( 1√
α
{√
2pi (k21σ
2
S + σ
2
N )
}1−α)
=
1
α
(2piσSσN )
1−α
.
(14)
Substituting Equations (14) into the distortion functions in
Equations (8) and (9), we have
DT (g, h) =
αT
∫∫
[p(S = s,R = r)]
αT vT [S = s, Sˆ = h(r)] ds dr
(2piσSσN )
1−αT
(15a)
DR(g, h) =
αR
∫∫
[p(S = s,R = r)]
αR vR[S = s, Sˆ = h(r)] ds dr
(2piσSσN )
1−αR
(15b)
5Also, note that the term [p(S = s,R = r)]α inside the
integral in the numerator of the distortion functions can be
further simplified as follows.
[p(S = s,R = r)]
α
= [p(S = s|R = r)]α [p(R = r)]α
=
[
N
(
k1σ
2
S(r − k0)
k21σ
2
S + σ
2
N
,
σ2Sσ
2
N
k21σ
2
S + σ
2
N
)]α
·[N (k0, k21σ2S + σ2N )]α
=
1
α
[2piσSσN ]
1−α
pα(S = s|R = r) pα(R = r),
(16)
where
pα(S = s|R = r) = N
(
k1σ
2
S(r − k0)
k21σ
2
S + σ
2
N
,
σ2Sσ
2
N
α (k21σ
2
S + σ
2
N )
)
,
(17a)
and
pα(R = r) = N
(
k0,
k21σ
2
S + σ
2
N
α
)
. (17b)
As a result, the distortions at Alice and Bob, given in
Equation 15, can be simplified into the following.
DT (g, h) = EαT
{
vT [S, Sˆ]
}
=
∫
pαT (R = r)
∫
pαT (S = s|R = r)vT [S = s, Sˆ = h(r)] dsdr
(18a)
DR(g, h) = EαR
{
vR[S, Sˆ]
}
=
∫
pαR(R = r)
∫
pαR(S = s|R = r)vR[S = s, Sˆ = h(r)] dsdr
(18b)
Note that the distortions in Equation 18 are similar in
structure to the case of unbiased agents, as discussed in [8]. In
such a case, if Bob’s value function vR(S, Sˆ) = (S − Sˆ)2 is
the squared error function, Bob’s distortion has a very similar
structure to that of MSE, averaged using the conditional
distribution pαR(S|R). Consequently, the optimal decoding
strategy at Bob is given by Sˆ = EαR(S|R), which is the mean
of the conditional distribution pαR(S|R). In other words, we
have
Sˆ =
k1σ
2
S
k21σ
2
S + σ
2
N
·R− k0k1σ
2
S
k21σ
2
S + σ
2
N
. (19)
On expanding R in Equation (19), we have
Sˆ =
k1σ
2
S
k21σ
2
S + σ
2
N
(k1S + k0 +N)− k0k1σ
2
S
k21σ
2
S + σ
2
N
=
k1σ
2
S
k21σ
2
S + σ
2
N
(k1S +N).
(20)
Note that Bob always nullifies the impact of k0. As a
result, Alice finds no incentive to invest any energy into
k0. Therefore, without any loss in generality, we henceforth
assume k0 = 0.
Since Bob uses squared-error as its value function, its best
response to Alice’s linear policy, as stated in Equation (11), is
given by Equation (19). Consequently, the distortion at Alice
due to the Bob’s best response strategy is given by
DT (g, h) = EαT
[(
S − Sˆ
)2]
, (21)
where EαT is an expectation over the distorted density function
pαT (R) · pαT (S|R) due to the presence of Alice’s cognitive
bias αT .
Note that Bob’s best response strategy is given by Sˆ =
E(S|R). Therefore, the distortions at both Alice and Bob can
be expressed in terms of the variance of pαT (s|r), as shown
below.
DT (k1) = EαT
[
(S − E(S|R))2
]
=
1
αT
σ2Sσ
2
N
(k21σ
2
S + σ
2
N )
=
αR
αT
DR(k1).
(22)
Notice that the distortions at both Alice and Bob are mono-
tonically decreasing with respect to k1. In other words, if Alice
has a power constraint, Alice always chooses k1 =
√
P
σ2S
in
order to minimize its distortion DT .
We summarize these results in the following theorem.
Theorem 2. In the standard Gaussian test channel with human
agents modeled using prospect theory, the following linear
strategies at Alice and Bob form a Stackelberg equilibrium
pair.
U∗ =
√
P
σ2S
S and Sˆ∗ =
σS
√
P
P + σ2N
R. (23)
Furthermore, the corresponding distortions at Alice and
Bob in the prospect theoretic sense are respectively given by
D∗T =
1
αT
σ2Sσ
2
N
(P + σ2N )
and D∗R =
1
αR
σ2Sσ
2
N
(P + σ2N )
. (24)
We study and discuss the implication of our results in
Theorem 2 in more detail, numerically in Section V.
V. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
The equilibrium strategies at both Alice and Bob stated
in Theorem 2, are the same as that of an unbiased agent.
However, the cognitive biases αT and αR have a scaling
effect on the distortions at Alice and Bob respectively. Another
important point to note is that Alice does not find any leverage
in the behavioral mismatch in order to improve its own utility.
Given that αT and αR lie within the interval [0, 1], we find
that the behavioral distortions at both Alice and Bob increase
as αT and αR reduce to zero. In other words, an agent (either
Alice, or Bob) is less satisfied than a rational agent if it has a
cognitive bias α < 1.
This phenomenon can be better understood from Figure 3,
where we plot the distortion function
D =
1
α
σ2Sσ
2
N
(P + σ2N )
, (25)
as a function of the total transmitter power P for α =
0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 1, σ2S = 1 and σ
2
N = 1. This analysis holds true
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Fig. 3: Distortion as a function of the transmitter power, P ,
for different values of α
for both Alice and Bob as the distortion functions in Equation
(24) both have the same structure as shown in Equation (25).
Note that the solid red curve in Figure 3 depicts the distortion
of an unbiased agent which has α = 1. Given that α ∈ [0, 1],
we observe that the distortion as perceived by an unbiased
agent acts as an lower bound, and deteriorates as the value of
α reduces to zero. In other words, although the same strategies
are used by Alice and Bob respectively, regardless of α, an
agent with a smaller α perceive a larger distortion than the
agent with a larger α. As a result, a smaller α requires a
larger transmitter power P to achieve a prescribed level of
distortion at the communicating agents. Furthermore, note that,
as pictured in Figure 3, the transmitter power P has a greater
impact on the agent’s distortion D for small values of α. In
contrast, the effect of α reduces with increasing transmitter
power P , since the distortions at both Alice and Bob converge
to zero asymptotically as P →∞ as depicted in our numerical
results in Figure 3.
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
We studied strategic communication between two human
agents modeled using prospect theory. We found that be-
havioral agents employ the same equilibrium strategies as
that of an unbiased agent, in the Stackelberg sense. We
have also shown that the distortions at Alice and Bob both
depend linearly on their respective weighting bias parameters.
Although the transmitting agent cannot leverage the mismatch
in cognitive bias with the receiver, it is the combined effect of
each agent’s cognitive bias and the transmitter’s power budget
that dictates the agent’s utilities.
In our future work, we intend to extend our results by
considering a more general set of Borel strategies at the
transmitter. We will also explore other channel models where
the equilibrium strategies are dependent on the cognitive
parameter α. We will also investigate the effects of other
cognitive biases such as value functions on the strategic
interaction between Alice and Bob. Furthermore, we will also
study the combined effects of both mismatched priors (beliefs)
and behavioral mismatches in several interactive frameworks
such as the Gaussian test channel and Bayesian deception in
the presence of behavioral agents.
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